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This study used a human-in-the-loop simulation to examine the feasibility of mixed equipage
operations in an automated separation assurance environment under higher traffic densities. The study
involved two aircraft equipage alternatives – with and without data link – and four traffic conditions. In
all traffic conditions the unequipped traffic count was increased linearly throughout the scenario from
approximately 5 to 20 aircraft. Condition One consisted solely of this unequipped traffic, while the
remaining three conditions also included a constant number of equipped aircraft operating within the
same airspace: 15 equipped aircraft in condition two, 30 in condition three, and 45 in condition four. If
traffic load became excessive during any run, participants were instructed to refuse sector entry to
inbound unequipped aircraft until sector load became manageable. Results showed a progressively
higher number of unequipped aircraft turned away under the second, third, and fourth scenario
conditions. Controller workload also increased progressively. Participants rated the mixed operations
concept as acceptable, with some qualifications about procedures and information displays. These results
showed that mixed operations might be feasible in the same airspace, if unequipped aircraft count is held
to a workable level. This level will decrease with increasing complexity. The results imply that integrated
airspace configuration is feasible to a limit. The results also indicate that the conflict detection and
resolution automation, equipage, and traffic density are important factors that will need to be considered
for airspace configuration.
Introduction
As the concept for automated separation assurance evolves, the airspace requirements needed to support it must be
established. One key design question is whether this future airspace should be segregated or integrated. Segregated (or
‘exclusionary’) airspace would only permit access to those aircraft that are supported by either ground-based or airborne
separation management automation. Integrated (or ‘non-exclusionary’) airspace would also permit access to unequipped aircraft
that require controller involvement in the separation assurance process.
The main advantage of segregated airspace is that it provides a more homogeneous operating environment (less variation in
aircraft equipage, roles and responsibilities for human operators, potential differences in separation requirements, etc.). Simpler
assumptions about the airspace should result in fewer complications during off-nominal events, and reduce controller workload
and confusion during normal operations. Forest and Hansman suggest that, as a side benefit, efficient segregated airspace could
also encourage users to invest in advanced equipage [Forest and Hansman, 2006].
However, segregated airspace could come at a significant cost in underutilized airspace capacity and in reduced user
flexibility, because such partitioning by definition limits access to all users. This could be especially problematic during weather
or other flow restricting events. Therefore, research into the feasibility of integrated airspace is warranted to determine whether
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aircraft with different levels of equipage can co-exist in the same airspace and under what conditions this may be possible
(Kopardekar et al., 2008) [2]. Once the feasibility of an integrated airspace with mixed equipage and its upper/lower bounds of
equipage mixture are established, future airspace designers can fully weigh the pros and cons of segregated vs. integrated
airspace.
Prior literature on mixed equipage or mixed operations airspace (involving advanced separation concepts, different Required
Navigation Performance (RNP) mixes, and different surveillance methods) has not been conclusive [Corker et al., 2000; Doble et
al., 2005; Pina and Hansman, 2004; Forest and Hansman, 2006; Hoekstra et al., 2000; Kopardekar et al., 2008; and Lee et al.,
2005]. Furthermore, the implications of mixed operations on airspace configuration were not addressed in these studies. The
current study examines the implications of mixed equipage on airspace configuration requirements for advanced separation
assurance operations, particularly under higher traffic densities.
Background
Forest and Hansman examined the impact of mixed equipage on oceanic operations by studying how different surveillance
rates and separation minima (RNP capabilities of aircraft on oceanic routes) impacted controllers’ reports of scenario difficulty
and situation awareness. This study found the 50% equipage scenario had the most reports of difficulty and loss of situation
awareness [Forest and Hansman, 2006]. Based on these results, the authors recommend further exploring airspace segregation as a
means of reducing the complexity of the mixed equipage environment. This was also viewed as a means for providing an
equipage incentive to airlines. In a follow-up study, Pina and Hansman found it was more difficult for controllers to correctly
detect conflicts when equipage was lower than 50%, and that controllers incor rectly identified conflicts between equipages of
20% through 60% [Pina and Hansman, 2004]. The study was very low fidelity, and examined only 10 aircraft in the simulation
scenarios.
The impact of mixed equipage on automated conflict detection and resolution was examined from the pilot’s perspective in
free-flight studies conducted by National Aerospace Laboratory of Netherlands (NLR). Hoekstra et al. conducted studies utilizing
predictive Airborne Separation Assurance (ASAS) [Hoekstra et al., 2000]. Three concepts for airspace management were tested,
one of which was fully mixed. In this condition, equipped and unequipped aircraft occupied the same airspace, with unequipped
aircraft monitored by the ground. The same conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) algorithms were applied for the equipped
and unequipped aircraft. Equipped aircraft did not have to maneuver around unequipped aircraft; a longer lead-time for CD&R
was used for unequipped aircraft so they would avoid the ASAS (equipped) aircraft. Two different levels of equipage (25% and
75%) were examined, and the study examined high traffic density. The other two concepts that were tested had some form of
segregation using an airspace structure similar to current day.
The NLR studies found the fully mixed condition most acceptable to the pilot subjects, with traffic density and equipage
having little effect on acceptability. The fully mixed procedure also resulted in fewer conflict resolutions; this was attributed to the
fact that unequipped aircraft were managed with a larger look-ahead time for conflict probing than the equipped aircraft. In all, the
study found that the fully mixed concept was preferred over the airspace segregation concepts.
Corker, et al. conducted a study that included two mixed operations conditions that varied the percentage of free
maneuvering aircraft [Corker et al., 2000]. Controllers maintained separation responsibility in all conditions, with the expectation
that they would cancel free maneuvering if separation assurance became a concern. Scenarios progressively increased traffic
count within each run, and measures of air-ground communications and self-reported controller workload were obtained
throughout each run. Contrary to initial predictions, controller workload was highest in the condition with the greatest number of
free maneuvering aircraft. The authors surmised that the operational concept led to these results, with controllers held responsible
for separation of free-maneuvering aircraft. In the 80% free maneuvering condition, controllers were overwhelmed by trying to
infer the intent of the free maneuvering aircraft, resulting in high overall workload.
In another study that explored a free-maneuvering aircraft concept, Doble et al. studied mixed operations by examining
scripted en route conflicts that involved both Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR) (free maneuvering) and Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) (controller managed) aircraft [Doble et al., 2005]. In contrast to Corker, et al., the controllers were not responsible for the
separation of AFR aircraft. In addition, the AFR aircraft were responsible for maneuvering around IFR aircraft in mixed equipage
conflicts. Under these circumstances, the study found that controller performance was not significantly affected by high numbers
of AFR aircraft. Taking a closer examination of the ground-side data, Lee et al. showed that the number of autonomous aircraft
appeared to have little to no impact on controller workload, even when peak autonomous aircraft sector count more than tripled
(from, e.g., 8 to 28) [Lee et al., 2005]. These results indicate strong potential for mixed operations to increase capacity. In
summary, prior research involving mixed equipage operations indicated overall feasibility. Furthermore, free maneuvering
concept simulations involving mixed equipage operations (i.e., aircraft that are capable of self-separating and aircraft that are
controller-managed) indicated a very high potential to increase capacity.
In spite of the potential benefits of integrated airspace, the Joint Planning Development Office’s (JPDO) Concept of
Operations suggests segregated airspace for trajectory-based operations. Given the prior research, however, it is unclear if such
segregation is warranted and, if so, at what level of mixed equipage it would be necessary. None of the prior studies specifically
examined the implications of mixed equipage on airspace configuration or identified limits of feasibility for mixed equipage
operations.
Therefore, the current study was conducted to examine if mixed equipage operations are feasible in the same airspace under
varying levels of traffic densities and varying equipage levels. With conflict detection and resolution automation for equipped
aircraft and conflict detection automation and resolution advisories for unequipped aircraft, it is hypothesized that mixed equipage
operations could be feasible at high overall traffic density with a significant number of unequipped aircraft. The following
sections describe the experimental method, results, and conclusions of the mixed equipage study.
Method
A. Experimental Design
The main objective of this study was to explore the feasibility and impact of mixed operations between equipped aircraft
managed by automation and unequipped aircraft managed by air traffic controllers.
All aircraft were Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and flight management system (FMS) equipped,
and had a required navigation performance (RNP) of RNP-1. Presence or absence of an FMS-integrated data link capability was
the single equipage factor distinguishing equipped and unequipped aircraft. This integrated data link capability (similar to that
supported by the Future Air Navigation System (FANS-1A) avionics package) enabled transmission of FMS-loadable trajectory
clearances directly from the ground. On the groundside, integration of data link with an automated CD&R capability enabled
ground automation to detect conflicts, construct trajectories to resolve those conflicts, and send them directly as clearances to the
flight deck, all without involving the air traffic controller. Flight crews could load and review the uplinked trajectory, and if it was
acceptable, engage the on-board automation to fly it. Furthermore, routine tasks, such as transfer of control and communication
between sectors, were also entirely automated for equipped aircraft.
In contrast, unequipped aircraft had no data link capability, and were managed by the air traffic controller through radio
voice communication.
The ground CD&R automation was responsible for detecting conflicts between all on-trajectory aircraft (both equipped and
unequipped), and for resolving conflicts between equipped aircraft without involving the controller. Controller participants were
responsible for resolving conflicts involving unequipped aircraft, and monitoring separation of unequipped off-trajectory aircraft.
Controllers could access the conflict resolution automation to request conflict free routes or altitudes and issue these to the
selected equipped or unequipped aircraft by data link or voice.
A general hypothesis of the study was that mixed equipage operations would be feasible with a low-to-moderate number of
unequipped aircraft. It was also hypothesized that there would exist a certain critical airspace complexity threshold that, if
exceeded, would make mixed operations infeasible. Conditions with a greater number of equipped aircraft were hypothesized to
increase the overall traffic complexity and the number of mixed conflicts in the sector, increasing controller workload, and
reducing the number of unequipped aircraft that could be safely managed. To investigate this hypothesis, the experiment design
varied two traffic factors, the number of unequipped and the number of equipped aircraft, to examine when mixed operations
become infeasible.
The experiment consisted of four conditions, incorporating a within-subjects design (Figure 1). The number of equipped
aircraft was varied across the conditions. In the Baseline condition (0x), there were no equipped aircraft. In the Conditions 1x, 2x,
and 3x, the number of equipped aircraft was held relatively constant at 15, 30, and 45 aircraft, respectively, across the 45-minute
scenario. These were approximately 1, 2, and 3 times the maximum traffic count that a single controller could manage in the test
sectors under current day operations.
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Figure 1. Experiment Design
In contrast, the number of unequipped aircraft was varied within each scenario, increasing linearly from around 5 to 20
aircraft, or until controller workload was subjectively assessed as at or above maximum. A confederate ‘supervisor’ assigned to
each participant was asked to monitor controller workload and restrict unequipped aircraft entry into the sector as needed. This
procedure was used during the simulation to establish a maximum unequipped aircraft count and ‘turn away’ count for each run.
i. Participants
Participants consisted of two certified professional air traffic controllers from Los Angeles Center (ZLA), and two
operations supervisors from ZLA and Denver Center (ZDV). Their air traffic control (ATC) experience spanned from 11 to 25
years with an average of 20 years of ATC experience. In addition to the participants, there were four subject matter expert (SME)
observers who provided additional data and feedback on operational feasibility.
Participants were divided into two groups of two and assigned to the first or second week of the study. Each controller
participated in up to 12 data collection runs. Two sectors with different traffic characteristics were selected for the study, and
controllers experienced each traffic condition in each sector at least once. Higher traffic conditions 3 and 4 were repeated when
possible.
ii. Airspace
The simulation airspace consisted of Sector 90 in Kansas City Center (ZKC) and Sector 91 in Indianapolis Center (ZID).
The traffic in ZKC-90 consisted mostly of en route aircraft in level flight (approximately 90% of all flights). Traffic flows in ZID-
91 were a mix of over flights, arrivals, and departures with approximately 80% in level flight. For a given simulation run, each
controller participant ran a single-sector problem, managing the traffic in either ZKC-90 or ZID-91. Retired controllers worked
surrounding sectors to handle regular controller duties such as handoffs and transfer of communication (TOC) for all incoming
and exiting traffic. All of the simulated aircraft were flown by pseudo-pilots.
iii. Operational Concept, Assumptions, and Separation Responsibilities
The concept was predicated on the assumption that the centralized groundside automation could detect and resolve conflicts
involving properly equipped aircraft that were on 4D trajectories. The groundside automation was configured to resolve conflicts
between equipped aircraft without controller involvement by issuing FMS-loadable data link clearances, thus maintaining
common trajectory intent between air and ground. Given similar ADS-B-out and FMS equipage, the ground side automation
could also detect conflicts for unequipped aircraft on known trajectories; thus it was important for the controller to keep
unequipped aircraft on 4D trajectories whenever possible. This was a new responsibility for controllers, and somewhat different
from current practice.
While data-link equipped aircraft were managed by the automation, controllers managed unequipped aircraft using manually
created or automation-generated resolution maneuvers. Lateral or vertical solutions could be developed using advanced path
planning tools. For a vertical path or altitude change, the controller issued the clearance and monitored the aircraft for safety and
conformance during the transition. For lateral route changes, ground tools provided the controller with an initial heading, time-to-
turn back, and the waypoint that returned the aircraft to its original path. The controller issued the initial heading change,
monitored the aircraft until it reached the turn back point, then cleared it direct to the next waypoint. Because of the imprecision
inherent in timing the heading change and turn back maneuvers, aircraft were likely to deviate somewhat from the automation
generated trajectory until they resumed lateral navigation to the next waypoint.
Whenever unequipped aircraft were not on their trajectories, controllers were responsible for keeping them safely separated
from other traffic. Controllers were also expected to monitor unequipped transitioning aircraft due to greater uncertainty in the
trajectory predictions during climbs and descents and the resulting degradation of automated conflict detection performance. In
order to enable controllers to monitor aircraft during off-trajectory and transitioning states, the data block or aircraft symbol
needed to provide a clear, unambiguous indication where separation responsibility resided.
As an additional operator’s incentive, the concept assumed that priority was given to data link equipped aircraft whenever a
mixed conflict occurred between equipped and unequipped aircraft. In this situation the controller was responsible for resolving
the conflict and was instructed to move the unequipped aircraft whenever possible. Assuming that the aircraft in conflict were on
their trajectories, a conflict between equipped and unequipped or between two or more unequipped aircraft was detected by the
automation and solved by the controller. Although priority was given to equipped aircraft when possible, the automation could
provide a resolution for either aircraft, and controllers could move either aircraft at their discretion.
B. Controller Workstations
The controller’s display was modified to support the redefined roles and responsibilities described above. Because trajectory
monitoring, transfer of control and communication, and conflict detection and resolution would be handled by the automation for
equipped aircraft, the controller did not need to maintain detailed awareness of each individual flight. Therefore the controller
workstation was drastically re-designed.
The goal of this redesign was to provide the controllers appropriate and adequate awareness of the automation-managed
(equipped) aircraft while maintaining focus on the unequipped aircraft that were their primary responsibility. Given the high
levels of traffic this concept could support, equipped aircraft were represented by a limited data block (which could be expanded
on demand) to reduce display complexity. Figure 2 shows the prototype display with 3x traffic (approximately 50 aircraft).
Controllers accessed the new CD&R tools through fields in the data tag, including a trial plan portal, the altitude, and a
number that signified minutes-to-conflict whenever the CD&R algorithm detected a conflict. Current day data tags were used for
unequipped aircraft, whereas equipped aircraft were depicted with low-lighted directional symbols and altitudes to provide a
general picture of traffic clusters.
Figure 2. Controller Display for Sector 90
When conflicts between unequipped and equipped aircraft occurred, the conflicts were highlighted in magenta. For both
mixed and unequipped only conflicts, the data tag color turned from green to yellow when the time-to-conflict was between two
and five minutes, and then to red when the time-to-conflict was less than two minutes. These changes in the data tag colors for
aircraft in conflict was intended to elevate the controller’s situation awareness of these aircraft.
Results
C. Aircraft Count
The average number of unequipped and equipped aircraft was recorded throughout each simulation run. Figure 3 shows the
average equipped and unequipped aircraft count over time for sector 91. A visual comparison of Figures 1 and 3 shows the actual
number of aircraft in the study matching the original design. The aircraft count for sector 90 showed similar patterns.
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Figure 3. Average Aircraft Count, Sector 91 –
number of unequipped (green) and equipped (beige)
aircraft observed during 0x, 1x, 2x, and 3x traffic conditions
As designed, the unequipped aircraft count ramped up linearly over time, peaking at around 20 aircraft by the end of the run.
Due to controller manipulation and the dynamic nature of air traffic, no two runs were exactly alike. In sector 91, unequipped
aircraft count in the 3x condition was noticeably lower than the other traffic conditions in the final 15 minutes of the scenario. The
observed peaks in total traffic were: 90-0x = 27, 90-1x = 39, 90-2x = 50, 90-3x = 64, 91-0x = 23, 91-1x = 39, 91-2x = 52, and 91-
3x = 62. Equipped aircraft count was based on the number of aircraft in the physical sector. Unequipped aircraft count was the
number of aircraft inside the physical sector plus the number of aircraft that the controller controlled outside the physical sector.
This combination was chosen because it closely represents the true load of aircraft the controllers managed.
D. Controller Workload
Workload ratings were obtained during data collection runs by prompting controllers every five minutes to assess their
instantaneous workload on a scale of 1 (very low) to 7 (very high), and then click on the corresponding button on the display.
Figure 4 shows the average workload ratings for sector 90 over time. Subjective workload increased over time as aircraft count
increased. Unlike the more linear increase in aircraft count, however, workload ratings show a slight inflection about 30 minutes
into the scenario, followed by a rapid increase until the sector became “unworkable.” For sector 91, which had more transitioning
aircraft, a similar but more linear trend was observed. Workload for sector 91 was rated higher earlier in the scenario, presumably
due to higher traffic complexity, and it too became “unworkable” in the final third of the run.
Controller workload was measured for both test sectors (90, 91) at different traffic levels (0x, 1x, 2x, 3x). The data was
analyzed using repeated measures Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The level of equipped aircraft significantly affected
workload ratings (p <0.005), but there were no significant effects on workload ratings between the two test sectors (p >0.20) or
the interaction effects of sector and traffic level (p <0.20). A One-Way ANOVA was then calculated to determine which of the
traffic level conditions (0x, 1x, 2x, 3x) significantly affected workload ratings. Of the six possible combinations, 0x vs. 2x (p
<0.05), 0x vs. 3x (p <0.025), and 1x vs. 3x (p <0.005) were significant.
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Figure 4. Average Workload Ratings for Sector 90 in 5-minute intervals
The results support the over-the-shoulder observations and participant feedback that 0x and 1x conditions exhibit similar
levels of traffic complexity. Both were “controllable” traffic with acceptable level of workload and no loss of separation. In
contrast, the 2x and 3x conditions exhibited higher traffic complexity due to increased overall traffic and a substantial increase in
mixed conflict frequencies, resulting in traffic that was “less controllable” with excessive workload and possible loss of
separation.
E. Number of Aircraft Turned Away
Total aircraft turned is the number of unequipped aircraft “turned away” when the participant sector load approached
maximum. Confederate supervisors were assigned to each participant to monitor his/her workload and to limit aircraft entering the
sector as needed. The number of aircraft turned away indicated when subjective controller workload reached its peak.
First, a Two-Way ANOVA was computed to test for significance. Again, sector (90, 91) and traffic level (0x, 1x, 2x, 3x)
were the independent variables. Traffic level significantly affected the total number of aircraft turned (p <0.001), whereas the
sector (p >0.20) and traffic level interaction (p >0.20) did not.
Second, One-Way ANOVAs were used to test traffic level and total aircraft turned significance. Significance was found in
four of six conditions: 0x vs. 2x (p <0.025), 0x vs. 3x (p <0.025), 1x vs. 2x (p <0.05), 1x vs. 3x (p <0.025). Similar to workload
ratings, the results support a general grouping of 0x/1x vs. 2x/3x traffic levels in terms of overall difficulty in controlling the
traffic.
Figure 5 shows the average number of aircraft turned away per traffic level condition for sectors 90 and 91. In the 0x
condition, no aircraft were turned, suggesting that the peak unequipped aircraft count was challenging but manageable. In the 1x
condition, the results were skewed by an anomaly of one participant turning away eleven aircraft, which accounted for all aircraft
turned in sector 90.
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Figure 5. Average Number Aircraft Turned Away for Sector 90 (blue) and Sector 91 (green)
All participants contributed to the average in the 2x and 3x traffic level conditions. At the 2x traffic level, several aircraft
were turned for each sector, though sector 90 had two more aircraft turned on average. Sector 91 was believed to be more difficult
during higher levels of traffic, due to transitioning aircraft. This is supported by an average of 9.75 aircraft turned during the 3x
condition.
An examination of when the controller turned the first aircraft shows a similar pattern of results. The traffic level
significantly affected when the first aircraft was turned (p <0.001). The sector and traffic level interaction were not significant.
In Figure 6, 0x had no aircraft turned, hence all 45 minutes passed with no first turn. The 1x condition had aircraft turned
relatively late in the scenario (minute 42), suggesting the controllers were not overworked until a few minutes before that time. As
the complexity increased over the conditions, controllers turned aircraft much sooner (some as early as 22 minutes in the 3x
condition). Sector 91’s average first turn was 28 minutes compared to sector 90’s 35 minutes. This supports the overall results that
sector 91 was more difficult to control due to greater traffic complexity.
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Figure 6. Time until First Aircraft Turned Away during 45-minute Simulation Run
F. Traffic Complexity Metrics
The relationship between subjective workload ratings and objective complexity metrics was examined using the step-wise
multiple linear regression method. Fifty-three traffic complexity metrics (sometimes called “dynamic density” metrics) have been
gathered from literature and their importance has been examined in prior studies by Kopardekar and Magyarits [Koardekar and
Magyarits, 2003]. For this study, 53 complexity variables were analyzed separately for equipped, unequipped, and total aircraft.
The regression of the full complexity variable set resulted in coefficient of variation (R2 = 0.864, R = 0.746). In order to
reduce the number of correlated variables, only variables with a variance inflation factor of 10 or less were identified. The
following complexity variables were found to be significant based on that criterion:
• Horizontal proximity of all aircraft
• Number of unequipped aircraft
• Horizontal proximity of unequipped aircraft
• Aircraft density of unequipped aircraft
• Separation criticality index of unequipped aircraft
• Percentage of unequipped aircraft that are either climbing or descending
• Number of aircraft predicted to be in a mixed equipage conflict
• Aircraft density of equipped aircraft
It is interesting to note that the horizontal proximity of all aircraft and the unequipped aircraft count were significant
variables. A possible reason is that the higher the horizontal proximity of the aircraft, the closer they are to each other, reducing
the options available to resolve a conflict. The reduced number of resolution options resulted in increased complexity for
controllers. The number of unequipped aircraft and their density (number of aircraft divided by the volume they occupy) were also
related to their proximity and their impact on reducing the number of available options in conflict resolution. The equipped
aircraft density also reduced the available options for unequipped aircraft, particularly for conflict resolution, which resulted in
increased complexity.
The separation criticality index refers to how close the aircraft are with respect to their separation minima. This index often
correlates with traffic density because higher density in the same airspace results in closer proximity between aircraft.
The percentage of climbing and descending unequipped aircraft increased complexity for controllers because climb and
descend profiles involve uncertainties and must be monitored closely. Aircraft predicted to be in mixed equipage conflicts also
added to complexity. The controller was instructed to give priority to equipped aircraft, moving unequipped aircraft using voice
clearances. At their discretion however, (e.g., due to traffic and/or time constraints), controllers could choose to move the
equipped aircraft via data link. In either case, resolving mixed conflicts involved added complexity.
As predicted, the greatest contributing factors to controller workload related to unequipped aircraft. The equipped aircraft
contributed to the overall workload by the sheer increase in traffic density, resulting in greater proximity between aircraft and 	 Comment EAB1] : SZ change
higher frequency of mixed equipage conflicts, reducing the number of maneuver options.
G. Conflict Analyses
Table 1 presents a side-by-side comparison of each test sector’s distribution of the average number of conflicts according to
the equipage mix of the conflict pairs. The number of conflicts between unequipped aircraft remains relatively constant across
conditions because the traffic count and patterns of unequipped aircraft does not vary significantly between experimental
conditions. In contrast, the number of mixed equipage conflicts increase along with traffic levels.
Table 1. Distribution of average number of conflicts per test sector according to equipage of conflict pair
Scenario
Sector 90 Sector 91
Mixed
conflict
Unequipped
conflict
Mixed
conflict
Unequipped
conflict
0x 0 11 0 7
1x 14 10 14 7
2x 22 11 26 7
3x 31 10 45 7
Although sector 91 has a lower number of unequipped conflicts than sector 90, the ratio between mixed and unequipped
conflicts is larger and grows more quickly with traffic levels – the final ratio between the two types of conflicts being nearly 7:1-
as opposed to 3:1 in sector 90. The rapid growth of mixed conflicts in sector 91 is likely due to sector geometry, more complex
route structures, and higher numbers of transitioning aircraft, resulting in greater traffic complexity.
Conflict resolution strategies in the mixed operations were also examined. This analysis included the type of maneuver that
was used for the resolution (lateral or vertical) as well as which type of aircraft was selected as the maneuvering aircraft in
conflicts involving an equipped and unequipped aircraft pair.
Of the types of maneuvers participants used for resolving conflicts, there was a strong preference for using altitude rather
than lateral maneuvers. However, a noticeable trend emerged where the percentage of lateral resolution maneuvers increased with
increased traffic. This is most noticeable in sector 91 where lateral maneuvers at 0x traffic level were limited to 7% of the overall
number of resolutions, compared to 3x, where lateral maneuvers made up 27% of the maneuvers. Increased use of lateral
maneuvers in higher traffic levels was likely due to the fact that with greater numbers of aircraft occupying the sector, fewer
conflict-free altitude maneuvers were available to the participant, especially in sector 91, which had a significant portion of the
airspace occupied by transitioning aircraft.
Although controllers were asked to solve the mixed conflicts by moving the unequipped aircraft, they were given the
authority and the tools to move the equipped aircraft if the traffic situation warranted it. Data on usage of the auto-resolution
function was analyzed to examine whether the equipped or unequipped aircraft were maneuvered to resolve mixed conflicts.
However, during 1x runs, controllers frequently resolved conflicts based on their own strategies and used the auto-resolution
function primarily to solve conflicts that were more difficult to resolve. In these difficult situations, they maneuvered the equipped
aircraft about one third of the time (31% in sector 90 and 43% in sector 91). In 2x and 3x runs controllers used the auto-resolution
function frequently for all conflicts and followed its built-in preference to maneuver the unequipped aircraft whenever possible.
For sector 90, the percentages were 7% of equipped aircraft maneuvered at 2x and 19% at 3x. Sector 91 showed a similar trend
with equipped aircraft maneuvered in 2% of the conflicts at 2x and 5% of the conflicts at 3x.
H. Separation Violations
Separation violations were reported when aircraft came within a distance of 5 nm laterally and 1000 ft vertically, and at least
one of the aircraft was unequipped. At the 0x level of traffic, no mixed or unequipped separation violations occurred in either
sector. In the 1x condition, sector 90 experienced a mean number of 0.75 violations, with none recorded in sector 91. Both sectors
experienced violations in the 2x condition, with more in sector 90 (M=0.75) than sector 91 (M=0.25). A violation increase in both
sectors was again observed at 3x, with sector 91 reporting a mean of 2.0 and sector 90 a mean of 1.0 violations.
These numbers are relatively low, given the high traffic density and workload. As expected, the number of separation
violations increases for the 3x condition, suggesting that a substantial increase in safety risk occurs between 2x and 3x traffic.
I. Participant Feedback
In the post-simulation questionnaire, participants and confederate supervisors were asked how many unequipped aircraft
they felt could be safely managed in sectors 90 and 91 for each condition. Average responses for sector 90, were 17, 16, 13, and
10 aircraft in the 0x, 1x, 2x, and 3x traffic conditions, respectively, and 17, 15, 11, and 9 aircraft for sector 91. Comparing these
aircraft counts to the subjective workload data recorded during the simulation found them corresponding to a workload rating of
between 2 and 3 (on a 1 – 7 scale) for each condition.
During the debriefing discussions, participants expressed a different criterion for safe management. If they were responsible
for monitoring separation when the aircraft were free track, climbing or descending, they suggested that they could safely manage
a maximum of three aircraft in these states.
Participants, observers, and confederate supervisors were asked whether the traffic density of the equipped aircraft
significantly affected the workload. They responded that workload was increased, because 1) there were more transitioning
aircraft, which increased complexity; 2) there were more mixed conflicts; and 3) there were fewer resolution options. They also
commented that as the traffic density of the equipped aircraft increased, the participants resorted to more automated conflict
resolutions due to fewer resolution options and not enough time to manually search for the optimum resolution.
Questions about mixed operations acceptability addressed how acceptable it was to: 1) rely on the automation for conflict
detection and resolution; 2) have aircraft in one’s sector but not under one’s control; and 3) manage unequipped aircraft in the
mixed environment. Responses resulted in average ratings of 5 and above (1=completely unacceptable; 7=completely acceptable)
for all questions.
Questions related to difficulty monitoring aircraft in different states in a mixed airspace environment suggested changes to
decision support tools that would improve situation awareness. Better display information for separation status of off-trajectory
aircraft, and an ability to monitor the turn back point in the voice-initiated lateral route change could lessen the overall monitoring
workload and increase safety.
Discussion
The results of this study give relevant insights into the feasibility of air traffic controllers managing unequipped aircraft
within the same airspace in which equipped aircraft are managed by ground automation. Complimentary research is being
conducted to investigate the appropriate level of automation for safely managing equipped aircraft [Prevot et al., 2008].
Controller workload depends on various complexity factors. Higher traffic density of equipped aircraft has a generally small
and predictable impact on controller workload, whereas factors related to the unequipped aircraft have a much more significant
impact. For example 45 equipped aircraft managed by automation may still allow a controller to safely handle twelve unequipped
aircraft as long as they are on their trajectories and the automation provides reliable conflict detection support. However, if three
of these twelve aircraft are on vectors or transitioning, the situation may become uncontrollable and too complex.
Therefore, the main complexity factors need to be properly managed when allowing unequipped aircraft to enter integrated
airspace that includes a high number of equipped aircraft. All aircraft should always be kept on trajectories to retain conflict
detection integrity. When 1x traffic density is clearly exceeded, controllers can no longer monitor aircraft for potential losses of
separation. In order to maneuver unequipped aircraft, procedures need to be in place to allow for a closed trajectory solution to be
transmitted to the aircraft and entered into the ground system. The process of issuing a heading and a turn back in two separate
steps is inappropriate for maneuvering multiple unequipped aircraft at high traffic densities.
The 0x condition showed that simply adding advanced ground automation (including CD&R) to an otherwise unchanged air
traffic control environment does not provide major capacity benefits. In line with previous research, controllers may be able to
handle a few more aircraft per sector, but the basic workload of conducting routine tasks and clearance based operations limits the
scalability of the traffic to little more than the current day monitor alert parameters.
Overall, this study indicates that static and strict airspace segregation is not needed and could unnecessarily limit capacity. In
the author’s opinion, airspace can be integrated and unequipped aircraft can get access as long as an examination of the primary
complexity factors does not exceed certain thresholds. Primary factors would have to include the number of unequipped aircraft
already in the airspace, the overall traffic density and the number of current and expected off-trajectory operations. As more
aircraft become equipped, fewer aircraft would likely get access to the integrated airspace. The results indicate that it is feasible
for a controller, with the help from automation for conflict detection and resolution, to manage unequipped aircraft within the
same airspace as equipped aircraft. Therefore, the study results suggest that the integrated airspace operations are feasible, to a
limit, with support from automation for conflict detection and resolution. This finding has clear implications on the airspace
configuration as a result of equipage and density.
Conclusion
The main results of this study indicate that the mixed equipage operations are feasible, to a limit, within the same airspace.
The higher the traffic density of equipped aircraft, the lower the number of unequipped aircraft that can be managed within the
same airspace. This is logical, because higher traffic density in the same volume reduces the degrees of freedom or maneuver
options for conflict resolution. Under such conditions, the controller workload also increases. The statistically significant
complexity factors also suggest aircraft density of equipped and unequipped aircraft impact the complexity. Interestingly, the
controllers accepted all aircraft under all unequipped aircraft traffic condition with current level of traffic. Under mixed equipage
traffic conditions, the higher the density of traffic, the earlier the controllers stopped accepting the unequipped aircraft in the
sector. The simulation showed that mixed equipage operations are feasible in the same airspace, even under higher traffic density
conditions such as 3x. However, there is a limit to which the controllers can manage the mixed equipage. In summary, it appears
that integrated airspace operations are feasible to a limit. The traffic density, automation levels for conflict detection and
resolution, and equipage will be key factors in the design and adjustments of the airspace configuration.
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List of Acronyms
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office
AFR Autonomous Flight Rules NLR National Aerospace Laboratory of Netherlands
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